1998 Working Papers Abstracts
| 412 |
Correcting for Selective Compliance in a Re-Employment Bonus Experiment
We propose a two-stage instrumental variable estimator
that is consistent if there is a selective compliance in the treatment
group of a randomized experiment and the outcome variable is a censored
duration. The estimator assumes full compliance in the control group. We
use the estimator to reanalyze data from the Illinois
re-employment bonus experiment. |
| 411 |
Organizational Structure and Perpetual Innovation: A Computational
Model of a Retail Chain
Abstract not available. |
| 409 |
The Supremum Argument in the New Approach to the Existence of Equilibrium
in Vector Lattices
Abstract not available. |
| 408 |
Impartiality and Interpersonal Comparisons of Variations in Well-Being
Abstract not available. |
| 406 |
Homeownership, Committed Expenditure Risk, and the Stockholding
Puzzle
Abstract not available. |
| 405 |
Assymptotic Arbitrage and Asset Pricing Models on General Index
Sets and on the Lebesgue Continuum
Abstract not available. |
| 404 |
The Murdukovich Normal Cone and the Foundations of Welfare Economics
Abstract not available. |
| 401 |
Does Cultural Origin Affect Saving Behaviour? Evidence From Immigrants
Abstract not available. |
| 400 |
International Treaties on Global Pollution: A Dynamic Time-Path
Analysis
Abstract not available. |
| 399 |
A Stronger Measure of Risk Aversion and a General Characterization
of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement
Abstract not available. |
| 398 |
The Equilibrium Level of Rigidity in a Hierarchy
A hierarchy is considered in which those agents who perform
better advance to higher levels. When agents are heterogeneous and endowed
with simple behavioral rules, Harrington (1998a) showed that agents at
high levels tend to be rigid, in the sense that their behavior is unresponsive
to their environment, relative to agents at low levels. In the current
paper, agents are homogeneous but sophisticated as their behavior is required
to be consistent with a subgame perfect equilibrium. Agents at high levels
are found instead to be flexible relative to agents at low levels. |
| 397 |
Electoral Selection, and the Creation of Ideologues
Abstract not available. |
| 395 |
The True Cost of Living: 1974 - 1991
Abstract not available. |
| 394 |
Non-Cooperative Games on Hyperfinite Loeb Spaces
Abstract not available. |
| 393 |
Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium Points in Large Non-Anonymous Games
Abstract not available. |
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